Showing posts with label Game Theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Game Theory. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Two Roads Diverging? Scientific Realism and Rational Choice

Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor (2010; here, gated) argue that game theoretic models may be instrumentalist, structuralist, or realist. Whether a model is realist or not hinges on whether or not "interpretive" evidence, that is, evidence about how the actors in question think about an issue, is useful as evidence in favor of game theoretic models.

In instrumentalist models, the truth of assumptions is irrelevant because a model's utility is in its predictions. In structuralist models, actors are forced into their responses by external structures, so how actors think and process is irrelevant. In realist models, assumptions need to be true because models are both descriptive as well as explanatory.

It seems to me, however, that interpretive evidence should also be useful in structural models because a structural model may also be realist. That is, in arguing that structures determine behavior, it makes no claim about reasoning regarding behavior. In some sense, it's really a realist argument that says that reason doesn't matter for behavior, so we should be able to see some disjunction between reasoning and behavior across different actors. So interpretive evidence would be useful here.


It does strike me that they are correct, however, about instrumental models and interpretive evidence. It also suggests that a realist can legitimately argue that some factors aren't relevant as part of their explanations, but this strikes me as different than assuming that something isn't relevant a priori. Is this correct?

But this hinges on a bigger question: So, can a scientific realist make simplifying assumptions (and know that he or she is making assumptions) and still be a realist? Or does being a realist mean you don't have the ability (luxury?) of making assumptions?

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Could Journalists Spend Five Minutes on Game Theory, Please?

A recent New York Times article, headlined as "Egypt's Leader's Signal Commitment to Civilian Rule" tells me little about what the Egyptian government has done to "signal" its "commitment." The UK's David Cameron visited, the country's top prosecutor wants to request that the Foreign Ministry freeze the assets of Mubarak, his family and his cronies, the military has appointed an opposition member to a ministerial position--as the Minister of Tourism, and the military has refused (so far) to reappoint a Minister of Information.

In none of these case has the government "signaled" anything or demonstrated that its commitments are "credible." That is, these actions are easy to do and easy to undo. In fact, few of them represent "actions" by the government at all. An important foreign dignitary visited and a prosecutor wants to do something to the Mubaraks. And appointing an opposition party member as the Minister of Tourism hardly seems earth shattering. I fail to see how this will entail any costs to the military should they choose to move in a less-than-democratic direction.

Also, Cameron refused to meet with the Muslim Brotherhood, saying "that the Egyptian uprising was 'not about extremists on the streets.'" This, perhaps, sends the clearest message of all those presented in the article. Namely, that the West still vitally misunderstands the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. The sooner the West stops associating the organization with extremism, the better. Indeed, such a move might even bolster the moderate elements of the organization.